Conjunctive Management Through Collective Action by unknown
Conjunctive Management Through
Collective Action 9
Cameron Holley, Darren Sinclair, Elena Lopez-Gunn,
and Edella Schlager
Abstract
This chapter focuses on the interaction between conjunctive management and
collective action. Collective action has several characteristics that provide a natural
‘fit’ with conjunctive management. These include building trust and ownership to
enhance water user’s acceptance of the need for better and more integrated
management and resolving conflict and facilitating trade-offs between and across
water users. But what are the opportunities and challenges for conjunctive man-
agement through collective action? And what types of settings encourage broad-
based collective action by water users and governments? These questions are
addressed through a comparative analysis of specific instances of groundwater
governance inAustralia, Spain, and thewesternUnited States ofAmerica. For each
case, the diverse policy and institutional settings are explained, and consideration
given to the motivators for, and successes of, conjunctive management and collec-
tive action. The chapter draws comparisons across the cases to suggest lessons on
incentives for conjunctive management, as well as exploring its challenges, before
identifying future directions for more effective integrated water management.
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Diverse policy and institutional settings provide different types of incentives for
engaging in adaptive integrated cyclical management of surface water and ground-
water (aka conjunctive management). This chapter’s interest lies in the interaction
between conjunctive management and collective action. In particular, it focuses on
the opportunities for, and challenges of, conjunctive management and collective
action as a combined strategy for managing variable water supply and incorporating
options for environmental watering.
While there is no settled, precise definition of conjunctive management, it can be
broadly conceived as involving the integration of water management decision-
making and action to maximise the benefits arising from the innate characteristics
of surface water and groundwater water use (e.g. surface water resources are more
visible and measurable, but more variable and typically more difficult to store)
(Evans et al. 2012; SKM 2011). Conjunctive management can take various forms,
for example, engineered (e.g. aquifer storage and recovery; see Chaps. 16 and 17),
non-engineered (e.g. integrated water planning; see Chap. 8 and Ross 2012a),
bottom up (e.g. at the farm level of sourcing water from both a well and from an
irrigation delivery canal, with some accompanying monitoring and evaluation to
develop local management objectives) and top down (e.g. a more strategic approach
where surface water and groundwater inputs are centrally managed/planned for)
(Evans et al. 2012, pp. 4, 6).
Crucially, conjunctive management is not limited to the coordinated or joint use
of surface water and groundwater, but rather the coordinated use of a portfolio of
resources, of which groundwater is particularly important for three key reasons.
First, groundwater has an in-built advantage during drought since it offers an
important buffer to climate variability due to its relative stability (and thus lowers
the risk). Second, it is a relatively inexpensive resource when compared to alterna-
tive climate independent sources such as desalinated or recycled water, with their
comparatively high energy costs. Third, it affords enhanced agency or control to
water users such as farmers through devolved decision-making (as compared to
surface water systems).
The inherent appeal of conjunctive management lies in the unity
(or connectedness) of the hydrological cycle. Recognising that the characteristics of
water resources vary according to the relative and particular contributions of surface
water and groundwater, this strengthens the case for examining opportunities for
collective (and integrated or coordinated) management. Indeed, the use of connected
groundwater and surface water systems can have significant implications for both
water quantity and quality of each, respectively (Brodie et al. 2007). Abstraction from
either can affect the quantity, quality and reliability/accessibility of abstraction from
the other, as well as impacting on the water supply to conjunctive dependent
ecosystems (e.g. low flows in rivers and certain wetlands) (SKM 2011, p. 4).
Alarmingly, the ‘disjointed’ use of groundwater can lead to undesirable effects
(Lopez-Gunn et al. 2011) ranging from a rise in piezometric levels, increasing the
risk of flooding and/or subsidence, problems of drainage and salinisation or marine
intrusion, the lowering of piezometric levels and higher pumping costs, and if connected
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to surface water flows, to a reduction in flows which can negatively affect wetlands,
springs, groundwater dependent ecosystems and river base flows. Conversely, conjunc-
tive management in a conscious and coordinated way (Andreu et al. 2010) can
ameliorate or even prevent many of these problems. This is where collective action
comes into its own by engaging water users as key conjunctive management
participants. Overseen by well-designed water rights systems, this can lead to better
and more integrated management outcomes. In this respect, collective action can take
various forms – between different tiers of government, between government and water
users, and between groups of water users themselves (Holley et al. 2011).
Collective action has several characteristics that provide a natural ‘fit’ with
conjunctive management. These include, in particular: the planning and day-to-
day management of water; contributing local knowledge to assist in the develop-
ment of a common understanding of water systems; building trust and ownership to
enhance water user’s acceptance of the need for better and more integrated man-
agement (Baldwin et al. 2012); and resolving conflict and facilitating trade-offs
between and across water users (SKM 2011; Brodie et al. 2007, p. 78).
Given these potential attractions, what types of settings encourage broad-based
collective action by water users and governments to deliver conjunctive manage-
ment? And what are the opportunities and challenges for conjunctive management
through collective action? These questions are addressed via a comparative analysis
of specific instances of groundwater governance in Australia, Spain and the western
United States of America, three leaders in water reform and conjunctivemanagement
approaches. Each national case study outlines the diverse policy and institutional
settings, and considers the motivators for, and successes of, conjunctive management
and collective action. Reflecting the diverse forms of conjunctive management, the
national cases explore various conjunctive management approaches, including
integrated basin and catchment planning in Australia, United States and Spain, as
well as augmentation plans/agreements and large-scale water infrastructure projects
involving storage and desalination in the United States and Spain. The chapter
concludes by drawing comparisons across the cases to suggest lessons on incentives
for conjunctive management, as well as exploring its challenges, before identifying
future directions for more effective integrated water management.
9.2 Conjunctive Management: Experiences from Australia,
Spain and the United States of America
9.2.1 Australia
By the latter stages of the twentieth century, significant weaknesses in Australia’s
water regulation began to emerge. In particular, state governments were granting
many new water licences to irrigators and others, with generous extraction
allocations attached (Bricknell 2010; Gray 2010). Under these arrangements sur-
face water and groundwater resources were generally managed separately (Ross
2012a). Subsequent fears of over-allocation and severe water shortages soon
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emerged. Broadly speaking, this crisis motivated state and federal governments to
come together and collaboratively address accelerating degradation of water
sources (Godden and Foerster 2011).
The result was a new national water management regime. Commencing in 1994,
and later taking shape under the National Water Initiative (NWI) in 2004, Australia
came to recognise connectivity between surface water and groundwater resources
and the need to manage connected systems as a single resource (Commonwealth of
Australia and the Governments of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South
Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory 2004, para 23
(x)). This included acknowledging hydrological connectivity considerations relat-
ing to trading of water rights (which have been separated from land), management
of environmental water, and most importantly for present purposes, the use of
collaborative planning for delivering integrated management of surface water and
groundwater (IANWI, paras 58(i), 79(i) (c), Schedule E, 5(ii); NWC 2008, p. 2).
Collaborative planning is now central to the pursuit of conjunctive use manage-
ment in Australia and is the primary instrument for achieving collective action
between governments and water users. As such, NWI principles include consulta-
tion with stakeholders, adaptive management of surface water and groundwater
systems and consideration of the level of connectivity between surface water and
groundwater systems (IANWI, paras 23(x), 25(iv), Schedule E, 5(ii), 6(i)). The
concept of connectivity has also been recognised in the recent Murray-Darling
Basin Plan (Basin Plan, Cth, 2012, cl10.19).
Individual state jurisdictions have considerable flexibility in how they imple-
ment these principles (Tan et al. 2012). In practice, however, water plans commonly
contain: rules for water allocation; rules for transferring water entitlements or
allocations; environmental outcomes; limits on extraction in certain places or at
certain times; and monitoring and reporting requirements (Gray 2012). Conjunctive
management is taken into account across these various elements, including in
identifying the environmental values and assets, setting the plan’s objectives, and
choosing the management tools to implement the plan (NWC 2011a, p. 99).
Consequently, the number of water plans that recognise surface water and ground-
water connectivity is growing (NWC 2011a, p. 99).
Despite this success, conjunctive water management has been piecemeal and
slow. For instance, few groundwater dependent ecosystems have well-established
environmental water requirements or effective monitoring programs (Lamontagne
et al. 2012). Further, while available modelling and data is improving, the historical
under-resourcing of data collection and analysis, and limited metering and enforce-
ment of extraction, particularly of groundwater, have inhibited progress (Holley
and Sinclair 2013a; Holley and Sinclair 2012; Baldwin et al. 2012, p. 75). Indeed,
as the National Water Commission explains, “Quantifying surface and groundwater
connectivity and aligning their management is unfinished business in most
jurisdictions. . . While all jurisdictions have developed policies for managing
connected surface water and groundwater systems, the implementation of
effective conjunctive management remains limited and the understanding of con-
nectivity in individual systems is still inadequate in many areas” (NWC 2011a,
pp. 10, 100).
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Why has conjunctive management remained ‘unfinished’ in Australia? And
what are the opportunities and barriers to conjunctive management and collective
action? These issues remain unresolved, not least because answers are likely to vary
between states and catchments. A comprehensive review of these experiences is
beyond a chapter of this size, so we instead draw some general insights on the
challenges and opportunities of conjunctive management through a collaborative
planning case study (for further on this study and its methods, see Holley and
Sinclair 2013b, pp. 37–38).
New South Wales (NSW) was selected because of its diverse range of surface
water and groundwater resources, and it is at the forefront of integrated water
management (Ross 2012a). Water sharing plans (WSPs) are employed to address
competing demands through rules for water use and trading and are developed under
the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW). The Act gives effect to the NWI goal of
sustainable and integrated water management, including the role of the community
in working with government to resolve water management issues (Water Manage-
ment Act 2000, s 3). Most NSWWSPs take the form of ‘Minister’s Plans’ rather than
as a result of a formal collaborative committee process (Water Management Act
2000, ss15, 50; Holley and Sinclair 2013b; Millar 2005). In making the WSP, the
Minister has the power to set up advisory or other committees for the purposes of the
Water Management Act and, as shown below, this was used in lieu of a more formal
collaborative committee route (Water Management Act 2000, ss 387, 388).
The first of NSW’s over 60 WSPs commenced in the early 2000s and were
prepared using a local committee approach with stakeholder consultation (NWC
2011b, p. 10). This study focuses on the development of one of these earlier plans in
a small upper catchment in the Namoi Valley, chosen because its surface water
channels exhibit a number of points of high connectivity with the local groundwater
system (SWS 2012, pp. vii, 103; Parsons et al. 2008; Kelly et al. 2007). The
particular ‘zone’ is subject to the Water Sharing Plan for the Upper and Lower
Namoi Groundwater Sources 2003 (covering 13 zones in total).
The catchment has a single river flowing through it, but this is usually dry as it sits on
top of a porous alluvial groundwater system, which is rapidly recharged from the
surface riverwater. In short, it is a highly connected system. The catchment is populated
by a comparatively small number of farmers (with 33 licence holders, but only around
15 active water users), with small holdings (around 40 ha). Other major stakeholders
engaged inwatermanagementwere a government department forwater (theNewSouth
Wales Office of Water (NOW) (now known as DPI Water)), the Namoi Catchment
Management Authority (CMA) (now known as North West Local Land Services), a
number of local councils and other property holders who did not actively use the
groundwater.
Notwithstanding that much of the groundwater resource is highly connected to
the Namoi River, the development of our groundwater WSP case was separated
from a surface WSP in the Namoi (NWC 2011b, p. 130). Both WSP’s began as
single resource drafts prior to the NWI being agreed at the national level. While the
NWI was finalised before the groundwater WSP was completed, the ultimate plan
provide little information on the potential connectivity between surface water and
groundwater (NWC 2011b, p. 131).
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The groundwater planning process began with the release of a socioeconomic
study into the region, followed by some initial consultation meetings in each zone of
the Namoi Valley (approximately 42,000 km2 in total, containing 100,000 people)
along with a series of related technical studies. With the Water Management Act in
place in 2000, a groundwater management committee was established to cover the
Namoi region. The committee included representatives from all the major stake-
holder groups highlighted above, and other relevant department and fishing bodies,
and had responsibility for developing the draft WSP, which it released in 2002
(Millar 2005, p. 9). Up to this point, there was little direct consultation with
stakeholders outside of the committee process (Holley and Sinclair 2013b).
The draft WSP was scheduled to begin operation in 2003 and was to be made
under s50 of the Water Management Act as a Minister’s Plan. Following some
controversy over the operation and amendment of s50 to exclude certain
requirements relating to public consultation, and an unsuccessful legal challenge
the WSP was put on hold while a review of the draft plan was undertaken (Millar
2005). This engaged representatives from peak irrigation bodies, and addressed in
particular the issue of uniform and proportional reductions versus allocation based
(at least partially) on ‘history of use’. In order to execute this policy the implemen-
tation of six groundwater plans was deferred so the department could establish
accurate information on the historical rates of extraction for all licensees (Gardner
et al. 2009, p. 320). Subsequently, a new revised WSP was completed in 2005, and
was scheduled to commence in 2006. In the interim, another far more comprehen-
sive round of consultation was undertaken with the assistance of the existing
stakeholder committee and the Namoi CMA. In terms of impact, the CMA consul-
tation process amended approximately a third of the clauses in the draft WSP. The
Minister approved the WSP, with the weighting of allocations favouring active
users over inactive users (see also New South Wales Government NSWG 2011).
The WSP came into force on 1 November 2006, and terminates on 30 June 2017.
While there were some disagreements over the mechanics of the above consul-
tation process, there were also key differences and disputes over its nature and
outcomes. These differing perceptions are fundamental to understanding the failure
of conjunctive management in this instance, and reveal ongoing unresolved
disputes between the different actors. Although there was, and remains, some
tension regarding entitlement reductions, of fundamental relevance were disputes
between government and non-government stakeholders. Holley and Sinclair’s
(2013b, pp. 44–50) research on the experiences of this case study zone reveal
four key areas of contention.
First the zone’s irrigators and NOW disagree as to the nature and content of the
consultation process that led to final WSP. In particular, the irrigators reported that
they were deceived by NOW as to a proposal for integrated water management
involving variable groundwater allocations that reflected highly connected surface
water and groundwater system and resulting rapid aquifer recharge by a stream in
their zone. The underlying rationale of the irrigators’ case was that the rapid aquifer
recharge in their zone could have been better harnessed to optimise water use
during wet and dry periods, including exploring storage options and more flexible
annual allocations. In essence, this would have entailed management rules that were
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more responsive to changing aquifer levels via a seasonal allocation of the catch-
ment as a whole, as opposed to a fixed sustainable yield as is common under
WSPs. For the irrigators, a more integrated planning process would have allowed
them to make trade-offs between flexibility and the security of water entitlements in
order to make better use of existing water supplies. This would have required
frequent monitoring of the catchment aquifer and river flows, such that water use
protected environmental flows. The rationale for this approach was that farmers
would be able to engage in a cooperative form of local governance (with external
oversight), in particular, adapting their management strategies in response to
changes in river flows and aquifer levels.
The irrigators believe they were given a firm undertaking by NOW (and its
predecessors) to seriously consider their proposal to respond to their catchments
biophysical conditions and put in place flexible integrated seasonally variable
targets: “they said they would look at it”. In contrast, the government claims no
such undertaking was given, nor did they receive any written proposals to that effect
from the irrigators. These different interpretations emerged from a decision-making
and consultation process that saw significant mistrust and disconnection between
government and the irrigators. One irrigator was of the view that “the [proposal] fell
over because farmers were not respected by NOW, and were not trusted to manage
the groundwater”. Whilst not agreeing with the irrigators’ interpretation of events,
even NOW respondents acknowledged that shortcomings in the consultation pro-
cess for the irrigators (discussed further below) had contributed to these fundamen-
tal divisions.
Despite the support of local farmers, in the end, the suggested management
approach was not adopted. The opportunities for more flexible exchanges between
different uses was instead overlooked in favour of groundwater only WSP, where
water users were given annual allocations that were tied to groundwater levels in
the catchment.
A second area of contention was the negotiation process in the lead up to the
WSP zone allocations. On all accounts, the process was time consuming but had
successfully involved many peak groups and, in the later stages, many farmers.
Even so, smaller irrigators and local farmers believe they ultimately had little say
(let alone an opportunity to contribute to a consensus agreement) in a decision-
making process that was dominated by large, downstream cotton irrigators and
governments. NOW respondents also acknowledged shortcomings in the consulta-
tion process for the case study’s irrigators, particularly in earlier stages:
There wasn’t a lot of consultation at local level with irrigators . . . I don’t know how up to
date they were on what was happening and the decisions being made above them. They
were out of the loop really. Government and peak irrigators were the main groups really
throughout the entire process
Third, even when the CMA engaged local irrigators in the latter stages of the
process, there were reportedly significant weaknesses in facilitating meaningful
negotiation. Although NOW and the CMA had provided significant technical
information on water conditions and hydrological modelling, and that some con-
nectivity estimates were incorporated into their underlying hydrological models
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(NWC 2011b), sufficient information was not always available to properly account
for groundwater-surface water interactions (Lamontagne et al. 2012). At the time,
stakeholders raised questions about the information used to assist with complex
decision-making. As one government respondent put it: “I guess by its nature,
complicated was necessary”. According to respondents, the lack of sufficient
government assistance effectively precluded many local irrigators from fully under-
standing and inputting into issues of connectivity and the implications for conjunc-
tive management. As one government respondent explained:
Another issue was the complexity of the model – because of this complexity, some
irrigators never really got it . . . You know you will always have people at one end of the
room who are switched on, and then you will have others who enjoy farming but not
following up issues and reading things. In hindsight some of the presentations could have
been simpler.
Fourth, and finally, and perhaps the biggest weakness, was that despite models
underpinning the WSPs, the resulting plan lacked sufficient provisions for
integrated management of connectivity (NWC 2011b, p. 14). Arguably, this has
constrained adaptation opportunities and the incorporation of conjunctive manage-
ment approaches. Indeed, even if one has faith in the fact that hydrological models
underpinning the plan continue to reflect aspects of connectivity modelling itself,
sufficient information is reportedly not always available to account for
groundwater–surface water exchanges in detail. Indeed, respondents pointed out
that relevant government agencies have failed to generate and share relevant
hydrological data, including an absence of information on their groundwater aqui-
fer status and trends (Holley and Sinclair 2011). As one catchment management
respondent noted, “they [NOW] are supposed to do Aquifer Status reports on a
quarterly basis, but we are lucky if we get a report every three years”.
There was a similar lack of sustained data sharing/dialogue between state and
regional institutions and the water users themselves, namely, the farmers. Follow-
ing the implementation of the WSP, it was claimed by catchment management
respondents that at first “the Department came along with good reports, but then this
stopped and people quickly lost interest”. Consequently, the farmer consultation
groups became dormant. Despite the availability of some data online, farmers said
they lacked the time and skills to find, access, use and then interpret relevant
information: “they tell us it’s in the public domain but they can’t find the time to
show us how to get to it and look at it” (Holley and Sinclair 2011). In the absence of
such data, effective water management (including ongoing monitoring and scrutiny
of the WSP itself) is difficult, with minimal information reported on the achieve-
ment of environmental or cultural outcomes, or progress towards these (NWC
2011b, p. 131).
Despite recent recognition of these issues there is still a long way to go until
successful conjunctive management of groundwater can be realised in catchments
such as this case study. Certainty, there are limits to generalising from a single case
(e.g. see the distinct history of developments relating to conjunctive management of
seawater intrusion, Petheram et al. 2008). However many of these findings appear
consistent with recent national evaluations (NWC 2011a). It is also important to
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remember that the case study was an early example of planning. The new Basin
Plan (Basin Plan 2012, Cth, cl10.19), ongoing review of WSPs in NSW (NSW
Office of Water 2013; NRC 2013) and new integrated and macro plans that
aggregate water sources into broader management units (O’Rourke and Bailey
2010) provide evidence and opportunities for necessary refinement to management
of groundwater surface water connections (NWC 2011b, p. 11). For example, the
recent Water Sharing Plan for the Peel Valley Regulated, Unregulated, Alluvium
and Fractured Rock Water Sources 2010 represents a substantial advancement in
NSW’s approach to integrated management of surface water and groundwater,
including different sets of rules to manage water resources with varying degrees
of connectivity (e.g. shallow alluvial groundwater below a river channel can be
managed by the same rules as surface water, whereas groundwater remote from the
river channel is managed as a separate resource) (Ross 2012b). Positive signs for
conjunctive management are also evident in the growth of managed aquifer
recharge (whose uptake in Australia has been patchy among different states, Dillon
et al. 2009, 2010) and national efforts to improving resource condition data (Water
Regulations 2008, Cth, Part 7). However, the full potential and impact of these
developments is still some years away, and it is clear that despite over a decade of
national objectives the implementation of conjunctive water systems through
planning is lagging.
9.2.2 Spain
Conjunctive water use is widespread in Spain, both in the interior (e.g. Madrid’s
water supply as the capital region is now underpinned by conjunctive use) (Flores
Montoya 1998), and along the Mediterranean coast, all the way from the internal
basins of Catalonia, down to the Jucar, the Segura and finally the Almeria basin.
Two features are peculiar to conjunctive use. The first is the role of water user
groups in the management of this conjunctive use. The second is the fact that
conjunctive use along the Mediterranean coastline (where there are high value
crops and economically important tourism) is seeking to enlarge the portfolio of
resources to reduce risk beyond surface water and groundwater, and is now
incorporating desalinated, recycled and even recharged water (Lopez-Gunn
et al. 2012). This means that management is complex both from the perspective
of resource management, and also in terms of coordination between a number of
actors. The leading ones are, however, the water user groups as ground managers,
and the respective river basin authority as the regulator.
Groundwater in Spain is a strategic resource in a number of basins and states
(Sahuquillo 2009). It is not a particularly noticeable resource in the Northern part,
whereas in parts of central Spain, like La Mancha or Almeria, it is the key water
resource for the regional economy. In the case of Catalonia, conjunctive water use
is part of day-to-day management, with a highly complex system of resource
management. People and economic activity has concentrated along the coastline,
where intensive groundwater use has led to problems with both marine intrusion
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and water quality, for example in the deltas of the Llobregat, Besos, Ter, Muga and
Francoli rivers (Planas 2010). Intensive use affects the cities in the region, and has
led to a complex management including built seawater barriers to prevent marine
intrusion and projects for aquifer recharge. The experiences on aquifer recharge in
the Besos and Llobregat rivers (Barcelona) are complemented with the pilot
experience with the Rı´o Belcaire (Castellon), which together represent 50 Mcm3/
year for the whole of Spain (Andreu et al. 2010).
However in terms of resource use, what is noticeable is that rather than conjunc-
tive use it is a case of ‘alternate’ use, i.e. surplus surface water is used to recharge
local aquifers for times when there is low surface water availability. The case of the
Cubeta de San Andreu is interesting because of the confluence between complex
resource use and a complex institutional framework that is needed for the conjunc-
tive use to run smoothly. The current plan for water resources is based on the joint
use of surface, groundwater, re-used water and desalination and water transfers.
This is a change from individual use to collective management, led under the
umbrella groundwater user group for Catalonia, the specific one of the Cubeta de
San Andreu, the public water supply company ATLL, and the regional water
administration through specific agreements.
The agreement signed between users and the regional water agency provides a
framework for a project of joint interest, e.g. aquifer recharge, covering technical,
legal and economic aspects. It includes aspects related to aquifer recharge, inven-
tory of water rights and the closing of some wells, the installation of water meters
and monitoring, technical advice, a chemical monitoring network and preparatory
work for the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD). Thus the goals or objectives
are both public and private. The main obstacles have been to reach enough level of
association and common vision, and closer links between administration agencies
(like agriculture and water admin), as well as giving political voice and representa-
tion to users in the decision-making bodies.
The case of Andalusia, in particular, the region of Almeria, bears some
similarities to the case of Arizona, except with one major difference: it is for use
in the largest greenhouse area in the world, the so-called ‘plasticulture’.
In the late 1990s to early 2000, with a lack of groundwater management in the
southern Mediterranean coastal belt, authorities looked to divert water from the
Ebro river in the north to help compensate for rapidly depleting aquifers (Llamas
et al. 2007). Water agencies tend to build projects far in advance of their justifiable
need on pure economic terms (Howe 2002). It is politically rational for decision
makers to prefer users to continue pumping than to take the (unpopular) decision to
cut allocations and instead opt for politically more popular water transfers. There
are very few systems of explicit conjunctive management. Once the National
Hydrological Plan of 2001 was derailed, Plan B centred on the construction of a
series of desalination plants along the coast, including Almeria. However, Spanish
farmers – like Arizona farmers – also balked at paying for expensive desalinated
water in bulk to substitute groundwater abstractions. However, in an ironic twist,
farmers do use desalinated water – which they consider ‘fresh’ to blend it with
highly salinised groundwater with high conductivities, which is an optimal solution
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in terms of lowering the risk of no water, while ensuring optimal conductivity for
high value tomato crops destined for export in Northern Europe. Farmers prefer
cheaper groundwater to desalinated water, despite the fact that desalinated water
prices are subsidised and do not reflect the true costs (which are borne by the
taxpayer).
The case of Jaen in the Upper Guadalquivir basin offers a completely different
narrative. Here, the discussion on conjunctive use is happening at the basin level,
partly because groundwater farmers upstream started intensive use of relatively
small aquifers, using water that technically was already ‘allocated’ to farmers
downstream. However farmers downstream were more ‘inefficient’ in terms of
Euros per drop (productivity) and also in terms of resource use (m3 per crop) which
has created a negotiation space. Intensive groundwater use upstream has meant the
rapid development of a region that was economically depressed, and where there
are now political pressures to keep these captured resources. Since in Spain,
contrary to the United States, there is no prior appropriation doctrine, it is the
river basin authority through basin planning that becomes the object of negotiation
for groundwater user communities upstream and surface water communities down-
stream. In one case, defending what are rather tenuous ‘use’ rights as compared to
full ‘de jure’ water rights. Yet it is an example where once this intensive ground-
water use has happened (it is fait accompli), the most likely scenario is to upscale
collective action to basin level in order to achieve the best possible ‘conjunctive’
use of both surface water and groundwater resources (Rica et al. 2014).
Looking at the Jucar case we see an interesting evolution in terms of conjunctive
use, from really early experiences dating to the early twentieth century, all the way
to current decisions being posed on conjunctive use on the river basin plan being
prepared in 2013. In this context the case of the river Mijares and irrigation in the
Plain of Castellon is a good example of conjunctive management, defined as
consisting both of the joint (or alternate) use (resource organization) and joint use
by users (social organization). An agreement was signed in 1970 to use water from
the Mijares River (Convenio de bases para la ordenacion de las aguas del rı´o
Mijares, 1970, OM-MOP-73), based on making use of the storage capacity of the
aquifer (estimated at 600 Mcm3) five times larger than the reservoirs of Sichar and
Maria Cristina, which had filtrations. Thus during dry periods use is made of
groundwater which is recharged during the wetter years by making use of surplus
flows from surface irrigation in the acequias or canals (Andreu et al. 2010).
The Jucar case offers some similarities to the case of Colorado, in the United
States, and to the case of the Guadalquivir, with a classic conflict between intensive
use of groundwater upstream and impacts on surface water users downstream. In
the first instance, like in other cases discussed in this chapter, there was a negotia-
tion between farmers in the Eastern Mancha aquifer in Albacete with the Jucar river
basin authority. However, during times of high water scarcity – in the midst of a
drought – like in the case of Colorado, the temporary solution was an augmentation
plan, to address the problem of low flows in the Jucar river, which eventually
impacted downstream into the Acequia Real del Jucar (a traditional surface water
irrigation area highly dependent on these flows). The Water Act of 1999 introduced
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an important change by partially introducing market instruments under the figures
of contract for the assignment of rights (Article 67 TRLA) and a centre for the
exchange of water rights (Article 71 TRLA) (Ferrer and Garijo 2013). The first case
has not been used frequently between users because it is fairly restrictive on the type
of water right. Most groundwater rights are private and these are barred from
participating in water rights exchanges. In the 2005–2008 drought, however, the
river basin authority negotiated with Eastern Mancha farmers for an area of
28,000 ha on the basis of a series of criteria centred on impact on river flows and
price offered. Exchange purchases went from 20 % to 5 % of the irrigation, securing
148 Mcm3 bought with (temporary) reductions to prevent the drying up of the river
bed as had occurred in the previous drought from 1994 to 1996.
It is important to stress that it is likely that this negotiation and agreement was
facilitated to a large degree due to the existence of a well-organised and cohesive
groundwater user group that acted as interlocutor with the river basin authority.
Thus after the emergency meeting due to drought from the Spanish Council of
Ministers in 2004, Centres for the Exchange of rights (art. 71) were set up in the
Guadiana, Ju´car y Segura which authorised these basins to undertake Public Offers
for the (temporary) Acquisition of Rights (Ofertas Pu´blicas de Adquisicion de
Derechos (OPAD)) (Table 9.1).
During the 2006–2008 drought other types of conjunctive management were
undertaken in the Jucar, including the use of non-conventional resources like
drainage flows from the Ribera del Jucar of up to 60 Mcm3/year via pumping
(costs paid by users); and water re-use (up to 94 Mcm3/year) where treated water
from Valencia city was partially exchanged for surface water in the Vega del Turia
thus freeing up Jucar resources. These were initiatives for conjunctive use using all
available resources and using a modelling programme to explore the different
options, including leading to a better comprehension by users of the range of
alternatives (Andreu et al. 2010).
The Jucar case is one of the best studied and most complex in Spain and one
which highlights a range of available models for conjunctive use as discussed by
Gardu~no et al. (2010). Equally, Andreu (a Spanish expert on conjunctive use
(Andreu et al. 1996; Andreu et al. 2010)), highlights the diversity of experiences
in Spain on conjunctive use not discussed here for reasons of space, and the
common denominator for their durability: success centred on collective action
Table 9.1 Results Ofertas Pu´blicas de Adquisicion de Derechos (OPAD)
2007 2008
Applications submitted: 119 234
Volume in rights (Mcm3) 56.8 109.6
Volume waived without economic compensation (Mcm3) 22.9 12.5
Volume offered (Mcm3) 27.3 50.6
Budget used (million €) 5.5 12.7
Reserved volume (Mcm3) 6.6 46.5
Source: Ferrer and Garijo 2013
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and adequate rules of game, which have to envisage different scenarios, give
particular emphasis to drought conditions and define the economic regime. What
is particularly relevant at a more macro scale from the perspective of joint use and
collective action is to make more flexible the opportunities for exchanges between
different uses as argued by Ferrer and Garijo (2013). At the catchment level scale,
conjunctive use of water opens up an interesting constellation of mutual interests
between surface water and groundwater, public water supply and irrigation and the
most suitable use of best quality water. Transfer of rents between sectors from those
that have a higher capacity to pay could also solve one of the most intractable
problems in the basin.
In conclusion, conjunctive management in Spain is a reality in many cases and it
has become particularly valuable as a solution to complex problems, where in
general the complexity of the resource use has been matched by the emergence of
parallel social institutions and collective entities to address conjunctive
management.
9.2.3 United States of America
In the United States, the primary authority over the allocation of ground and surface
water resides with states. Each state has its own water laws and water administra-
tion system making it difficult to generalise about water policy in the United States
(Getches 2008). Although the states are the lead actors in deciding whether and how
conjunctive management occurs, the federal government is often a participant
because of its authority over different activities that impact water. Beginning in
the early twentieth century, the federal government began a long-term program of
financing and building large surface water storage and delivery projects (Reisner
1993). The projects are often sources of water for conjunctive management
programs. Later, in the 1970s, environmental laws extended the reach of the federal
government. In particular, the Endangered Species Act has impacted how states and
their water users place water to productive uses (Aiken 1999).
Since it is impossible to adequately address the water experiences of each of the
50 states, this section focuses on the experiences of three western states, Arizona,
Colorado, and Nebraska. These three states were selected because of their variation
in water administration that in turn has affected their experiences with conjunctive
water management. Arizona’s water arrangements are highly centralised within the
Arizona Department of Water Resources (ADWR), which administers groundwater
and conjunctive water management programs. Local jurisdictions, such as irriga-
tion districts, cities and counties deliver water to end users, but have limited
discretion in governing water (Colby and Jacobs 2007). In contrast, Nebraska’s
water arrangements are highly fragmented. Local natural resources districts have
the primary authority to manage groundwater, whereas the Nebraska Department of
Natural Resources has the authority to manage surface water (Harnsbarger 1984).
Until very recently, the state held minimal decision making authority over ground-
water, thus making it difficult to coordinate groundwater and surface water uses.
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Finally, Colorado may be characterised as more of a polycentric system. Concur-
rent and overlapping powers to govern water are shared across the three branches of
government – specialised water courts, the state water engineer, and the legislature
– with water users organised in irrigation districts and companies, well associations,
and municipal water utilities (Blomquist et al. 2004). No single branch of govern-
ment or local or regional water organization dominates water governance.
While each state’s water laws, administration, and experiences are different,
each state turned to conjunctive water management to provide solutions to a series
of conflicts confronting water users and the state governments. It is the nature of the
conflicts, combined with the state’s water laws and water geography that shaped
conjunctive water management responses. For Arizona, conjunctive water manage-
ment emerged from conflicts over how to develop and use its allocation of Colorado
River water. Allotted over 2 million acre feet of water annually from the river, it
required a multi-billion dollar project of canals and pumping stations to deliver a
substantial portion of that water to the most populous areas of the state. One of a
number of conditions that Arizona accepted in order for the US Bureau of Recla-
mation to build the $(US) 4.8 billion Central Arizona Project was to adopt a new
state groundwater code that would regulate groundwater pumping and limit the
mining of groundwater (Leshy and Belanger 1988). The 1980 Arizona Groundwa-
ter Management Act established the framework for conjunctive management. It
created four active management areas (AMAs), later expanded to five when one of
the original AMAs was split in two, extending from central Arizona south to the
international border with Mexico. Within the active management areas, agricultural
groundwater rights were quantified and capped and municipalities were subject to
limits and over time reductions in the amounts of groundwater they could pump to
serve their residents (Leshy and Belanger 1988). The portions of Arizona not
covered by active management areas continued under the historic groundwater
regulatory regime of reasonable use (Colby and Jacobs 2007).
By the early 1990s, the Central Arizona Project was complete and began
delivering water, however, the state faced a serious crisis. The state intended to
repay its portion of the cost of constructing the project by selling water. The
primary water users, irrigators, balked at purchasing the water because it was
substantially more expensive than pumping groundwater. Over the course of
several years, negotiations among the Federal government, state, and municipal,
agricultural, and rural interests resulted in revisions to the 1980 Groundwater
Management Act, some of which encouraged the recharge of Central Arizona
Project water underground to be withdrawn at a later date (Glennon 1995). Large
water districts, municipal utilities, and the Arizona Water Banking Authority have
developed a series of direct and indirect recharge projects storing several million
acre feet of water over the past decade. For instance, from 1997 to 2012, the
Arizona Water Banking Authority which recharges ‘surplus’ Central Arizona
Project water has accumulated over 3 million acre feet of recharge credits (Arizona
Water Banking Authority 2013).
Arizona has a highly focused and directed conjunctive water management
program – long term underground storage of its allotment of Colorado River
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water. The millions of recharge credits are likely to become an important source of
water for irrigators and municipal water providers in the next couple of decades
because of anticipated water shortages in the Colorado River Basin due to extended
drought and climate change impacts.
Colorado, like Arizona, also has active conjunctive management programs and
projects in place in the most heavily populated river basins in the state. However,
the conflicts that stimulated a conjunctive management response and the resulting
practice of conjunctive management are distinct. The first century of European
settlement and economic development, roughly between 1849 and 1949, was
supported by the construction of surface water storage and distribution systems.
Water development was based on and supported by the prior appropriation doctrine
in which water is allocated on a first in time, first in right basis. During times of
scarcity, those water users most senior in time receive their water allotments while
those more junior in time bear the water shortages. The State Water Engineer
administers water rights and develops information for water courts to guide the
creation, modification, and transfer of water rights. Water courts are the venue in
which water users bargain, negotiate, and contest over water rights (Blomquist
et al. 2004).
Beginning in the 1950s, irrigators began installing high capacity wells. Within a
decade, groundwater pumping began to noticeably affect river and stream flows.
Under Colorado water law, groundwater that is hydrologically connected to surface
waters is governed under the prior appropriation doctrine. In practice, this meant
that groundwater rights were junior to surface water rights and under the prior
appropriation doctrine wells should not be pumped until surface water rights were
satisfied. Such a strict application of the prior appropriation doctrine would shut off
access to a major source of water, one that is particularly important during times of
drought, and limit the expansion of irrigated agriculture and municipal and indus-
trial development. Conflict between Colorado surface water and groundwater users
also spilled across state borders as water users in downstream states claimed that
they were being denied their rights to water by groundwater pumping occurring
upstream in Colorado. Efforts to incorporate groundwater into the state’s prior
appropriation system and to ensure that interstate water allocation agreements are
adhered to largely rest on conjunctive management programs and projects
(Blomquist et al. 2004).
In Colorado, conjunctive management protects and maintains surface water
flows while allowing for groundwater pumping. The state legislature passed a series
of laws that gave the state water engineer the authority to engage in rule making and
that allowed for the development and use of augmentation plans. Augmentation
plans, which must be approved by water courts (as must any rules and regulations
developed by the State Water Engineer), allow well owners to augment stream
flows to cover the effects of groundwater pumping. Augmentation plans may take a
variety of forms. Well owners may lease surface project water and make it available
to the Colorado state water engineer to release to the stream or river when needed.
Or, they may purchase surface water rights and leave the associated water in the
stream to cover the effects of groundwater pumping. Or, some irrigation companies
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and districts run surface water in irrigation ditches and ponds, allowing it to
percolate into the ground and eventually return to the river to cover the effects of
groundwater pumping (Blomquist et al. 2004). Wells not covered by court approved
augmentation plans have been shut down (Cowan 2012).
Like Colorado, Nebraska’s conjunctive water management efforts have been
directed at protecting and maintaining river and stream flows. Surface water is
governed by the prior appropriation doctrine and is administered by the Department
of Natural Resources. Groundwater is governed by local natural resources districts
that have the authority to regulate groundwater access and use. Each district is
governed by an elected board, and elected members are typically irrigators who
pump groundwater. Until recently, the state had no authority over groundwater and
natural resource districts were not required to pay attention to the effects of
groundwater pumping on surface water flows (Schlager and Blomquist 2008).
The efforts to coordinate groundwater and surface water use occurred because of
crises in relation to surface water users. In the Platte River Basin the surface water
users were endangered species and in the Republican River Basin the surface water
users resided in the downstream state who claimed that Nebraska groundwater
pumpers were in violation of an interstate water sharing agreement. The endangered
species in the Platte River Basin limited new water development and threatened
existing water uses that required permits from federal agencies (Aiken 1999). Most
importantly for Nebraska, the state’s largest water and electric utility held permits
issued by the Federal Electric Regulatory Commission to operate hydroelectric
dams that were soon to expire. Permit renewal would require aggressive actions to
protect endangered species. The two upstream states in the basin faced similar
threats to their water projects as well. The three states and the federal government,
over the course of a decade, negotiated an agreement that provided additional flows
to the river for endangered species recovery and to cover all water development that
affected the river from 1997 onward (Schlager and Blomquist 2008; Freeman 2010;
Kenny 2011). One of the sticking points in achieving an agreement was Nebraska
actively regulating groundwater wells and pumping in the basin. The upstream
states did not want to provide additional water to the river only to have it diverted
by irrigators in Nebraska (Freeman 2010). At about the same time, the 1990s, the
state and irrigators in the Republican River Basin were gearing up for a US
Supreme Court suit brought by Kansas, the downstream state claiming that
Nebraska’s well owners were diverting water that belonged to Kansas irrigators,
causing Nebraska to violate its water sharing agreement. The Supreme Court found
in favour of Kansas and required Nebraska to regulate groundwater pumping
(Schlager et al. 2012).
Nebraska and its water users struggled to develop an agreed upon process for
spanning the chasm between the surface water and groundwater management
systems. Over the course of a decade (1994–2004), which witnessed a variety of
experiments to settle the intense conflict between surface and groundwater users,
the legislature finally adopted a statute that established an integrated water man-
agement planning process (Nebraska Department of Natural Resources 2006). The
Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (NDNR) was granted the authority to
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declare river basins fully allocated or over allocated. Once such a designation
occurred, the NDNR and the affected natural resources districts were required to
collaborate to develop integrated management plans. The Platte and the Republican
Rivers natural resources districts were the first to develop such plans (Nebraska
Department of Natural Resources 2006).
Integrated Management Plans form the foundation for conjunctive water man-
agement in Nebraska. Well moratoria and strict pumping limits reduce the pressure
on surface water flows. In addition, several districts in the Platte River Basin are
experimenting with groundwater recharge projects by placing water in unlined
canals and pits to percolate underground (Bradley 2011). While conflicts continue
to simmer among the state’s groundwater and surface water users and between
water users and state agencies, the era of integrated or conjunctive management has
arrived in Nebraska.
The form and function of conjunctive water management varies across the states
as do the processes and outcomes of such management. The states differ on how
broadly based collective action occurs, or to put it another way, the interests and
values that are represented in decision-making processes. In Colorado, broad-based
participation is built into the water administration system. Individuals,
organizations, and state agencies who hold water rights or who regulate water
rights have a seat at the table and that table is typically the water court. Any
water rights holder who believes his or her water right will be affected by a decision
may participate in court processes. Given such a process, the State Water Engineer,
as a routine matter, convenes advisory groups consisting of water rights holders to
guide the development of regulations before they are brought before a water court
for approval. In Nebraska, participation occurs in a more ad hoc fashion. When
substantive legislation is required to address water issues, the legislature often
convenes commissions and task forces with representatives of different types of
water uses from across the state to hold hearings, conduct investigations, and make
proposals. In developing integrated management plans, temporary advisory
committees may be established to participate in their development. The Arizona
water administrative system allows for much more limited participation in conjunc-
tive management processes. Participation involves organizations and agencies with
access to Central Arizona Project water and with the financial wherewithal to
engage in larger scale conjunctive management projects. A number of interests
and uses have been excluded from pursuing different forms of conjunctive man-
agement, most notably those that are organised around perennial rivers outside of
active management areas. Since state law does not recognise the hydrologic con-
nection between ground and surface water, nor does it provide local jurisdictions
with any policy tools to regulate groundwater, rivers are slowly being desiccated
with little that surface water rights holders, recreationists, and environmentalists
can do (Glennon 2002).
Conjunctive management represents a key form of adaptation to changing
biophysical and societal demands among the three states. For Arizona, conjunctive
management represented a response to a societal crisis, but later morphed into a
response to changing biophysical demands. When the primary beneficiaries –
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groundwater irrigators – of a major surface water project were financially incapable
of utilizing the project leaving the state in debt and with surplus water, conjunctive
management was adopted. Now conjunctive management is viewed as a key tool in
buffering water users against the effects of climate change.
For Colorado and Nebraska, conjunctive management was an important
response to biophysical issues that generated conflict. The hydrologic connection
between surface water and groundwater had to be actively managed in order to
protect surface water flows and the users dependent on those flows. In addition,
conjunctive management allows Colorado and Nebraska water users to make trade-
offs between flexibility and security of water rights in order to make better use of
existing water supplies. For Colorado, augmentation plans provided flexibility –
allowing for groundwater use to occur, while also protecting surface water rights.
Integrated management plans play a similar role in Nebraska – securing surface
water rights and flows while allowing for continued use of groundwater. In turn,
integrated management plans set the stage for the development of different forms of
conjunctive management.
All three states – Arizona, Colorado, and Nebraska – have witnessed success
with conjunctive management. Conjunctive management has allowed water users
and the states to address various water related crises and makes possible more
active forms of water management. However, each state’s conjunctive water
management programs also exhibit some limitations. First, environmental issues
receive little attention. True, Nebraska is using conjunctive management to recover
endangered species on the Platte River, however, that is the price the state must pay
in order to protect existing water uses and allow for new water uses in the future.
Coordinating the use of hydrologically connected ground and surface water would
also allow Arizona to protect relatively rare riparian habitat and the rights of surface
water users, but, thus far, the legislature has not been convinced to act. Second, the
states have just begun to tap the potential of conjunctive management. The states
could more actively coordinate groundwater and surface water use by allowing
surface water users to move to groundwater during droughts, with water remaining
in streams and rivers to provide for habitat and species protection and for down-
stream water uses, while limiting pumping and actively storing water underground
during wet years. However, such flexibility would come at the potential cost of
security of water rights as pumps may not be shut off during wet years.
9.3 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter has shed light on specific instances of conjunctive management and
collective action in Australia, Spain and the United States. The nature of these
approaches varied, including examples of integrated basin and catchment planning
in Australia, Nebraska and Upper Guadalquivir basin; large scale water infrastruc-
ture projects involving storage and desalination in Arizona and Almeria; as well as
augmentation plans and other agreements in Colorado, Jucar and Catalonia.
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Each had considerable success. Australia’s ‘top down’ water reforms involving
national frameworks and state implementation gave rise to a suite of legislation and
policy instruments and plans that recognise the importance of managing connected
water systems as a single resource. In the United States, the more limited national
role produced significant variation among states in their conjunctive management
approach, but all three demonstrated success, not least facilitating water users and
the states to address various water related crises through more active forms of water
management. Finally, in Spain’s hybrid and multilevel system, involving regula-
tion, voluntary agreements and informal water markets/trading, conjunctive man-
agement is tackling various complex problems across a range of water resources.
This approach encompasses the ability to engage with water users groups to create a
shared vision and accommodate groundwater recharging through formal
agreements. It also has facilitated links between administrative agencies to establish
consistent conjunctive management approaches.
However, in their own ways, the experiences in each country also evidenced a
number of limitations and challenges. In Australia, despite clear national
objectives, the implementation of conjunctive water management via collaborative
planning has been patchy. Groundwater and surface water remain siloed, science on
connectivity was limited and key water user stakeholders were marginalised from
integrated decision-making (Lamontagne et al. 2012, p. i). In terms of collective
action, consultation was often inadequate, with a lack of meaningful dialogue, poor
information and an absence of time and skill on the part of water users. Smaller
users, in particular, felt disenfranchised from the process. In the United States,
conjunctive management policy also lagged in some areas, including limited
attention being given by the legislature and others to environmental issues, and
an absence of more active coordination of groundwater and surface water use. In
Arizona, in particular, collective action through the participation of water users in
the management process was absent, and in Colorado, such participation was
largely limited to the legal and regulatory development phase, as opposed to
ongoing management. Although more advanced in pursuing collective action than
Australian and the United States, Spain, too, has confronted conjunctive manage-
ment challenges. There are lingering tensions between groundwater and surface
water users, and between upstream and downstream users, both of which may be
exacerbated in drought conditions. Further, the political voice of water user groups,
and their subsequent participation in decision-making, has been less than ideal.
What broader comparative lessons can be gleaned from these case studies?
While there are inherent dangers in generalizing from this type of research,
nevertheless, a number of insights can be drawn from our findings across the
different contexts and institutional arrangements of the three countries. They
suggest some key lessons with regard to the types of settings that facilitate con-
junctive management and collective action, and also associated challenges and
limitations.
In terms of encouraging a participatory approach to conjunctive management,
the case study findings support the proposition that governments and water users are
more likely to pursue conjunctive management where social and environmental
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crisis arise. Such crises included over-allocation in Australia, fights spurned by
endangered species (Platte River Basin in Nebraska), conflicts between water users
in the United States (e.g. Colorado) and Spain (e.g. Jucar and Guadalquivir), battles
over how to develop and use allocations (e.g. Arizona and Almeria) and a mix of
pressing water problems including marine intrusion, water quality and low surface
water availability (Catalonia). Certainly, the ultimate shape of the conjunctive
water management responses may vary according to the nature of the crisis
(as well as other institutional variables), however, collectively, the findings suggest
that its presence is a powerful motivator for parties to engage in conjunctive
management.
The case studies reveal a second condition that encourages and enables conjunc-
tive management through collective action, that is, institutional recognition of
hydrological connections (between ground and surface water), including, in partic-
ular, the devolution of management tools to water users on the ground. The
importance of this condition was notable by the impact of its absence in the NSW
case study from Australia, as well as limiting access to conjunctive management in
Arizona in the United States. In NSW, the policy framework promoted a vision of
connectivity and integrated management of surface water and groundwater, how-
ever this vision was not translated effectively into state government action and
rules. Groundwater and surface water remained isolated with little provision in
WSP for integrated management. This effectively stymied local water users in their
desire for conjunctive management. Similarly, in Arizona, the failure of state law to
recognise the hydrologic connection between ground and surface water effectively
excluded different forms of conjunctive management in local jurisdictions outside
of active management areas.
The importance of institutional recognition in facilitating conjunctive manage-
ment was evident across other case studies, as well. There were examples of legal
frameworks accommodating conjunctive management, be it through rights of
participation in courts and legal recognition of augmentation plans and integrated
management plans (United States), or policies that integrate resource management
through conjunctive rules, a willingness of government agencies to work with water
users groups and agreements tailored to different exchanges between water uses
(Spain).
Beyond these pre-conditions, there are lessons about the challenges confronting
the ongoing management of conjunctive use. While conjunctive management has
the capacity to adapt to changing biophysical circumstances and societal demands,
this was not always assured in the case studies. For example, it is apparent that
conjunctive management struggles to accommodate a comprehensive suite of
environmental issues – this is an issue that legislatures and government agencies
need to progress further. This remains an issue in the Unites States, in particular in
Arizona, where there has been little progress coordinating the use of hydrologically
connected groundwater and surface water to advance the protection of rare riparian
habitat. Similarly, in Australia and Spain, much work remains to be done to
effectively manage the impacts on groundwater dependent ecosystems and
establish environmental water requirements. Entrenching consideration of
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environmental issues within conjunctive programs is accordingly an area that
demands policy attention.
Another obstacle to effective conjunctive management was a lack of meaningful
engagement of water users in integrated water decision-making and implementa-
tion. In NSW, Australia, opportunities to incorporate local water users’ knowledge,
preferences and ideas relating to conjunctive management and connectivity were
stymied by limited consultation, the provision of overly complex data and an
inability of government and users to reach agreement. This contrast with Catalonia,
Spain, where the political voice and representation of users was better able to
contribute a common vision in support of conjunctive management. Meanwhile,
the complete exclusion of surface water rights holders, recreationists and
environmentalists from the regulation of groundwater outside of active manage-
ment areas in Arizona, the United States, has undermined broader conjunctive
management processes.
Overcoming this obstacle will require institutional settings that better facilitate
water users participation in conjunctive management decision-making. While much
will depend on context, a range of successful examples from the case studies
include commission/taskforces/advisory committees in Nebraska, open court pro-
cesses to those who hold water rights in Colorado, the use of modelling
programmes to generate better comprehension by users of the range of alternatives
and harnessing well-organised groundwater user groups to act as interlocutors with
the government decision makers in Jucar.
In conclusion, conjunctive management through collective action remains a
‘work in progress’ across the case studies. While there are some encouraging
green shoots appearing in a range of international jurisdictions, notably in terms
of policy, legislative and regulatory recognition of groundwater and surface con-
nectivity and integrated management, as is often the case, difficulties arise in
effective delivery. Certainly, the presence of a ‘crisis’ can motive institutional
actors, providing of course they have the necessary tools and resources. The
greatest challenge is, however, how to effectively engage a broad suite of actors,
particularly water users on the ground, to deliver conjunctive management through
genuine collective action.
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